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HYBRID MISMATCH.COM: NEUTRALIZING THE
TAX EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH
ARRANGEMENTS
by
Maria S. Domingo*

I. INTRODUCTION
One reality is as certain as taxes: when people—even
accountants—think of taxes, dating is not the first topic to come
to mind. Oddly enough, though, what follows closely resembles
today’s online dating phenomenon (at least as closely as tax ever
could).
What began as personals or personal ads, first printed in
local newspapers, have evolved into global online dating
services, which are now commonly used by individuals who are
looking to find their “perfect match.” These services provide
subscription dating products around the world through websites
and mobile applications that help individuals in their quest to
find and develop a meaningful connection.1 Online dating
includes search and matching features that enable users to search
profiles, receive algorithmic matches and may use locationbased technology—the mix of these features is “constantly
subject to iteration and evolution” in response to “competitors’
offerings, user requirements, social trends and the technological
landscape.”2 In the digital world, online dating, akin to a present
Assistant Professor, Department of Accounting, School of Business, The
College of New Jersey, Ewing, New Jersey
*
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day matchmaker, has yielded favorable outcomes for many of
its users and produced lucrative business results.3
Much like individuals looking to find their “perfect
match,” multinational enterprises (MNEs) have found
connections in the tax laws of various jurisdictions to develop
the perfect mismatch in their cross-border transactions, which
until recently has produced favorable outcomes for MNEs and
lucrative tax savings. Consistent with the premise that
“opposites attract,” hybrid mismatch arrangements use the
differences in the tax treatment of financial instruments, entities
or transfers to create favorable asymmetrical tax effects between
countries that are part of the same transaction. The mismatch
can result in a deduction with no corresponding income
inclusion or even a double deduction that erodes the MNEs’ tax
bases in the applicable jurisdictions and substantially reduces
their aggregate tax burden. In a globalized world, governments
need to consider how different tax regimes interact with each
other in cross-border activities and the overall tax effect of these
transactions. As part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the United
States has codified key provisions (in line with the OECD’s Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting Plan) meant to shut down the effects
of hybrid mismatch arrangements. However, different tax
jurisdictions have divergent interests and reason follows that
each country’s goal is to protect its tax revenue. Absent global
minimum standards, how long before taxpayers evolve with
another iteration of tax strategies that work around anti-hybrid
recommendations in perhaps more amenable locales or
jurisdictions?
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: Part II
provides background regarding the U.S. worldwide tax system
(prior to Pub. L. 115-97) compared to the territorial tax system.
Parts III and IV provide an overview of hybrid mismatch
arrangements and discuss tax policy issues. Part V navigates
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through the key provisions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act that
directly impact hybrid mismatch arrangements and discusses
proposals for reform. Lastly, Part VI concludes.
II. TAX REGIMES
Background – U.S. Tax System
U.S. international transactions are generally divided into
two broad categories for tax purposes: outbound transactions
and inbound transactions. Outbound transactions involve U.S.
citizens and residents (including domestic corporations created
or organized in the U.S.) doing business and/or investing abroad;
as inbound transactions involve foreign taxpayers (nonresident
aliens and foreign corporations) doing business and/or investing
in the U.S.
Outbound Transactions:
From a U.S. tax perspective, “outbound” pertains to U.S.
persons, i.e., individuals or entities with foreign source income
and/or that engage in activities outside of the U.S. Prior to the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (“TCJA”),4 the U.S. imposed a
“worldwide” tax system (or residence-based system) in which
domestic corporations were subject to U.S. tax on a worldwide
basis. In general, domestic corporations were subject to U.S.
income tax on all income irrespective of whether the corporation
derived income from a U.S. source5 or a foreign source. The
U.S. imposed entity-level taxation on a C corporation’s taxable
income at statutory federal income tax rates of up to 35%. To
ameliorate the potential for double taxation that may result from
U.S. taxes imposed on a domestic corporation’s foreign source
income, the domestic corporation could claim a foreign tax
credit for income taxes already paid to foreign countries, subject
to certain limitations.6
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A domestic parent corporation was subject to U.S. tax
when its foreign corporate subsidiaries (which conduct foreign
operations) repatriated their earnings as dividend distributions to
the U.S. parent corporation. As a result, the U.S. tax on such
income was generally deferred until the foreign subsidiary
repatriated the income—that is, U.S. multinationals could defer
U.S. tax indefinitely on their foreign subsidiaries’ active income
until the foreign subsidiary repatriated the income as a dividend
to the U.S. parent corporation.7 Under Subpart F8 prior to its
amendment under TCJA and the passive foreign investment
company9 provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (antideferral tax provisions), the domestic parent corporation was
subject to immediate U.S. tax only on certain items that its
foreign subsidiaries earned as passive income (e.g., interest,
dividends, annuities, rents and royalties) or highly mobile
income regardless of whether the foreign subsidiaries distributed
the income as a dividend to their U.S. parent corporation. The
Subpart F provisions, in essence, treated certain passive income
of a controlled foreign corporation as a deemed dividend to its
U.S. parent subject to immediate U.S. taxation (i.e., no deferral
until repatriation).
Simply put, a U.S. multinational company was subject to
U.S. tax on its worldwide income reduced by foreign tax credits
and active foreign profits (e.g., foreign subsidiary’s earnings)
only upon repatriation to a U.S. parent. As a result,
multinational enterprises (“MNEs”) implemented tax strategies
to shift profits from the U.S.10 to no-tax or low-tax jurisdictions.
Inbound Transactions:
From a U.S. tax perspective, “inbound” pertains to nonU.S. persons, i.e., individuals and entities with U.S. income
and/or that engage in U.S. activities—including, for example, a
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foreign corporation with U.S. source income and/or U.S.
activities. Prior to the TCJA, foreign corporations were subject
to U.S. tax only on income with sufficient nexus to the U.S., i.e.,
income “effectively connected” with the conduct of a trade or
business in the U.S. In other words, the U.S. taxes a foreign
corporation’s income generated within U.S. borders.
“Effectively connected income” generally requires that the
taxpayer have a physical presence or use assets in the U.S., and
such income is taxed the same as income of a U.S. corporation
(e.g., same tax rates). However, tax treaties between the U.S.
and the applicable foreign country may cap the amount of U.S.
tax on a foreign subsidiary’s income.11 Moreover, foreign
corporations are still generally subject to a U.S. withholding tax
of 30% on interest, dividends, rents, royalties and certain types
of income from U.S. sources, which a treaty may also decrease
or eliminate.
Territorial Tax
Many other countries have adopted the “territorial” tax
system (or source-based tax system), in which a country taxes
an MNE’s income sourced only within its borders, i.e., income
earned within the country’s tax jurisdiction. Foreign source
income (i.e., income generated outside of the country’s borders)
is not subject to tax by the corporation’s country of residence
under this system. Therefore, the territorial tax system generally
exempts from taxation the distributions of controlled foreign
subsidiaries. As such, it is important for countries that have
implemented a territorial tax regime to determine accurately the
source of a multinational’s revenues and expenses. Pursuant to
the participation exemption,12 the U.S. has recently made strides
toward a territorial tax system via a 100% dividends-received
deduction on certain foreign source income distributed to U.S.
corporate shareholders.
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III. HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS
In recent years, governments have become increasingly
alarmed by MNEs’ use of aggressive tax planning in their crossborder transactions.13
The practical reality is that a
multinational corporate group functions more akin to a single
undivided organization rather than separate individual
organizations—that is, the parent corporation may strategically
coordinate its direct or indirect control of subsidiaries and/or
affiliates to reduce overall taxes of the group and thereby
increase profitability as a whole.14 Revenue authorities and tax
policy makers have expressed concerns about the difficulty of
taxing MNEs engaged in cross-border activities (e.g., lack of
transparency, increased level of complexity and sophistication
in structuring cross-border transactions) and a rise in BEPS.15
The different tax regimes of multiple jurisdictions have resulted
in asymmetrical tax effects between countries that are part of the
same transaction. This asymmetry, in turn, enables taxpayers to
engage in base erosion and profit shifting.16 Therefore, it is
imperative in a globalized world for governments to consider
how different tax regimes interact with each other in crossborder activities and the overall tax effect of these transactions.17
In an effort to neutralize aggressive tax planning, the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(“OECD”)18 and G2019 countries have adopted a 15 Action Item
plan to address BEPS. In 2015, the OECD issued final reports
on the 15 Action Items, which aim to ensure that profits are taxed
in the jurisdiction where the MNEs performed the economic
activities that produced such profits and where value was
created.20 Interestingly, the OECD’s recommendations require
that one country (to determine its own tax treatment) take into
consideration the taxpayer’s position and tax treatment in
another country. This view is generally alien to legislators in
most jurisdictions whose primary concern is to protect their own
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country’s tax base.
In particular, Action 2 provides
recommendations for domestic law and tax treaty provisions to
neutralize the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements. In a
surprise move, the U.S. has more recently enacted legislation
that adopts a number of the OECD’s recommendations. But are
these recommendations enough to curtail these arrangements?
What are hybrid mismatch arrangements?
Hybrid mismatch arrangements are cross-border
transactions that exploit the differences in the tax treatment of
financial instruments, entities or transfers between two or more
tax regimes. These arrangements both comply with the tax laws
of the applicable jurisdictions and yet, use the very same laws to
erode the tax bases in these countries. Oftentimes to the benefit
of the taxpayer (and detriment of revenue authorities), these
arrangements may result in “double non-taxation” or tax
deferral.
Hybrid mismatch arrangements can substantially
reduce the aggregate tax burden of MNEs that are engaged in
these transactions.21 The structured arrangements generally use
hybrid financial instruments, hybrid transfers, and/or hybrid
entities to achieve (1) a deduction with no corresponding income
inclusion (“D/NI”), (2) a double deduction (“DD”), (3) an
indirect D/NI or (4) foreign tax credits.
Specifically, D/NI arrangements create a deduction in
the payer jurisdiction (e.g., interest expense, which erodes the
MNE’s tax base in that country) without a corresponding
inclusion in the payee’s ordinary income by a second country
that is involved in the same transaction. Simply put, a
multinational group deducts a payment under the tax system of
the payer jurisdiction without a requisite inclusion in the payee’s
ordinary income. In DD arrangements, the MNE claims an
income tax deduction for the same contractual obligation in two
different jurisdictions—that is, multiple deductions are claimed
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for a single expense. Foreign tax credit generator arrangements
enable MNEs to generate foreign tax credits that would
otherwise be unavailable (e.g., generate multiple foreign tax
credits for one amount of foreign tax paid). Indirect D/NI
arrangements involve payments that are deductible in the payer
jurisdiction, which the payee then offsets against a deduction
under a hybrid mismatch arrangement. Accordingly, hybrid
mismatch arrangements reduce the taxpayer’s collective tax
base resulting in significant overall tax savings.22
Cross-border conflicts in the characterization of a
payment between multiple jurisdictions can result in tax
mismatches of sorts. The OECD’s recommendations are
“linking rules” intended to align one tax jurisdiction’s treatment
of a hybrid financial instrument or hybrid entity with the tax
consequences in the counterparty jurisdiction to the transaction.
The rationale behind the recommendations is to “ensure
matching of income and deductions across international
boundaries.”23 The OECD divides the recommendations into a
primary response and secondary/defensive rule where the
defensive rule is administered only if the other jurisdiction lacks
a hybrid mismatch rule or the jurisdiction does not apply the rule
to the arrangement.24 The rules focus on the payments and
whether the characterization of the payment results in a
deduction for the payer and income recognition for the payee.
In general, the primary rule provides that the payer jurisdiction
deny the taxpayer’s deduction for a payment if the payment is
excluded from payee’s (recipient) taxable income in the
counterparty jurisdiction or the counterparty jurisdiction also
permits a deduction for the same payment. If the payer’s
jurisdiction does not apply the primary rule, then the
counterparty jurisdiction may apply the defensive rule, which
requires the payee to include the amount as income or deny the
duplicate deduction.25 In order for these rules to apply, a hybrid
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element must bring about the mismatch in tax outcomes in the
first place.
The OECD’s approach is to provide recommendations
upon which each country can legislate domestically in a
consistent and coherent manner with other jurisdictions. The
following discusses simplified examples26 of hybrid mismatch
arrangements to illustrate their overall tax effect along with the
OECD’s recommendations for domestic law to counteract these
transactions.
Hybrid Financial Instruments:
Hybrid financial instruments are instruments that two or
more countries involved in the same transaction treat differently
for tax purposes because of a conflict in the tax jurisdictions’
characterizations of the instrument. For example, the instrument
is considered debt in one jurisdiction and equity in another
jurisdiction. In other words, the jurisdictions differ in their tax
treatment of the same payment, which the taxpayer makes under
the instrument. In the following example, an MNE uses a hybrid
financial instrument to achieve a favorable D/NI result.
Example 1:27 A Co., a resident of Country A, owns
100% of B Co., a resident of Country B. Country A’s domestic
law exempts dividends paid by a foreign company if its
shareholder held greater than 10% of the company’s shares in
the 12-month period before the foreign company pays the
dividend. Country A has no law in place that denies the
dividend exemption in the payee jurisdiction (Country A) for
payments that are deducted in the payer’s jurisdiction (Country
B). In other words, Country A has no law in place that denies A
Co. the dividend exemption in Country A for payments that B
Co. deducts in Country B. B Co. borrows money from A Co.
via a hybrid financial instrument. The terms of the loan require
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a market interest rate payable every six months in arrears. B
Co.’s interest and principal payments under the loan are
subordinated to B Co.’s creditors and B Co. can defer the
payments if it does not meet certain solvency requirements. It
is important to consider the characterization of the instrument
and tax treatment of the payments thereto under the domestic
law of each party’s jurisdiction.
A Co.
Country A

Hybrid Financial
Instrument

No income
inclusion

Payment

B Co.
Country B

Deduction

Country A and Country B Perspectives: Country B
treats the instrument as debt and permits the payer, B Co., to
deduct the interest payments. Meanwhile Country A treats the
instrument as equity and exempts the payment as a dividend
under its domestic laws. Accordingly, A Co. is not subject to
tax on receipt of the payment. Therefore, the transaction results
in a D/NI outcome.
OECD’s
Recommendations:
The
OECD’s
recommendations are intended to align the treatment of an
MNE’s cross-border payments via a hybrid financial instrument
such that if the payer’s jurisdiction treats the payment as an
expense then the payee’s jurisdiction recognizes the payment as
ordinary income.28 As the primary recommendation, Country B
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should deny B Co. the deduction to the extent the transaction
causes a D/NI outcome, i.e., B Co.’s interest payment is denied
to the extent A Co. excludes the amount from its income under
Country A’s laws. As the defensive rule, if Country B does not
apply the primary response, then Country A should require A
Co. to include the payment in ordinary income.
Example 1.1:29 Interestingly, the OECD’s final report
includes an example using the territorial system. The facts are
the same as Example 1 above except that Country A follows a
territorial tax regime and, therefore, taxes only domestically
sourced income. Furthermore, B Co. has no permanent
establishment in Country A. A Co. treats the interest income
from B Co. (a non-resident) as foreign source income, which is
exempt from tax in Country A.
Country A and Country B Perspectives: Under the
domestic laws of Country A, A Co. excludes the interest from
its income and, thus, is not subject to tax on the interest income.
B Co. may deduct the interest payment under the domestic laws
of Country B. Therefore, the transaction results in a D/NI
outcome.
OECD’s Recommendation: Although the transaction
results in a D/NI outcome, the mismatch is not derived from the
terms of the financial instrument itself but rather the territorial
tax regime of Country A—that is, A Co. is exempt from tax on
any foreign source income. The parties could not change the
terms of the instrument in any way that would make the interest
payments taxable in Country A. Thus, the hybrid financial
instrument rule applies only if the mismatch results from the
terms of the financial instrument itself.
In contrast, in Example 1, Country A (payee jurisdiction)
exempts only dividend income. Country A’s tax exemption of
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the dividends in Example 1 is attributable to both the source of
the payments and the terms of the financial instrument.
Therefore, the transaction results in a hybrid mismatch.
Hybrid Entities:
Hybrid entities are entities that one country considers
non-transparent or opaque for tax purposes while another
country treats the same entity as a transparent flow-through or
disregarded entity. For example, one country may treat an entity
as a C corporation (that is taxed as a separate legal entity) and
another country treats the same entity as a partnership (whose
partners are generally taxed on their share of the partnership’s
income subject to certain exceptions). In the following example,
an MNE uses a hybrid entity to achieve a favorable DD result.
Example 2:30 A Co., an entity resident of Country A,
owns 100% of B Co., a foreign subsidiary in Country B. B Co.
is a hybrid entity—that is, B Co. is treated as a disregarded entity
under the laws of Country A and a separate legal entity under
the laws of Country B for tax purposes. B Co. borrows money
from a local bank and pays interest on the loan.
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A Co.
Country A

Deduction

Loan

BB Co.
Co. A
Country
Country BB
Country

Deduction

Bank
Country C

Payment

Country A and Country B Perspectives: Country B
views B Co. as a separate legal entity, and, therefore, gives rise
to an interest deduction in Country B. Meanwhile, A Country
disregards B Co. and treats A Co. as the borrower of the loan
permitting A Co. to deduct the interest payment in Country A as
well. As a result, the taxpayer achieves a double deduction (i.e.,
Country A deduction and Country B deduction) for the same
interest payment.
OECD’s Recommendations: The OECD recommends a
“linking rule” that aligns the tax results in the payer jurisdiction
(Country B) with the parent jurisdiction (Country A).31 The
OECD’s primary recommendation is for the parent jurisdiction
(Country A) to deny the duplicate deduction to the extent the
payment gives rise to a DD outcome. As the defensive rule, if
the parent jurisdiction (Country A) does not apply the primary
response, then the OECD recommends the payer jurisdiction
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(Country B) deny the deduction to the extent the payment gives
rise to a DD outcome. The defensive rule applies only if the
parties to the mismatch are in the same control group or
structured arrangement in which the taxpayer is party to that
structured arrangement. Moreover, no mismatch arises to the
extent the deduction offsets dual inclusion income. 32
Imported Mismatch Arrangements:
After a taxpayer engages in a hybrid mismatch
arrangement between two countries, the taxpayer may shift or
import the tax benefit of that offshore hybrid mismatch into a
third country via a financial instrument (e.g., an ordinary loan).33
Imported mismatch arrangements rely on the void of effective
hybrid mismatch rules in offshore jurisdictions to achieve the
mismatch in tax results, which the taxpayer can then import into
the payer jurisdiction. In the following example, an MNE uses
an imported mismatch arrangement to achieve a favorable D/NI
result.
Example 3:34 A Co., an entity resident of Country A,
owns 100% of B Co., an entity resident of Country B. A Co.’s
business is to lend money to medium-sized enterprises. In a
back-to-back financing arrangement, A Co. lends money to B
Co. via a hybrid financial instrument, and B Co. then lends the
same money to C Co., an entity resident of Country C. C Co. is
sufficiently involved in the arrangement’s design to understand
its mechanics and anticipated tax results. Country A treats the
hybrid financial instrument as equity and exempts the interest
payment from B Co. as a dividend under its domestic laws.
Country B treats the hybrid financial instrument as debt (to A
Co.) and has not implemented hybrid mismatch rules under its
domestic laws. C Co.’s financial instrument in Country C is an
ordinary loan (from B Co.).
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No income
inclusion

A Co.
Country A

Hybrid Financial
Instrument

Deduction

B Co.
Country B

Income

Payment
Loan

Borrower Co.
Country C

Deduction

Country A, Country B, and Country C Perspectives:
Country A exempts the interest payment from B Co. to A Co.
from tax under Country A’s domestic law, while B Co. deducts
its interest payment to A Co. on its Country B tax return under
Country B’s laws. C Co. deducts its interest payment to B Co.
on its Country C tax return under Country C’s laws, while B Co.
includes the receipt of the interest on its Country B tax return.
As a result of this structure, the taxpayer achieves a favorable
indirect D/NI outcome between Country A and Country C. In
Country B, B Co.’s interest payment to A Co. should offset the
interest income from C Co.
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OECD’s Recommendations: The OECD recommends a
“linking rule” as its primary recommendation, which requires
the payer jurisdiction to deny the deduction for the payment to
the extent the payment generates an indirect D/NI tax result. In
other words, the payer jurisdiction (Country C) should deny a
deduction for payment to the extent the payee (B Co.) treats such
payment as an offset against a hybrid deduction (B Co.’s interest
payment to A Co.) in the payee jurisdiction (Country B).35 Thus,
if the primary response is implemented, then C Co.’s deduction
is disallowed, B Co.’s receipt of interest income from C Co. is
offset against B Co.’s interest payment to A Co., and A Co.
recognizes no income on the interest received from B Co. There
is no defensive rule for the imported mismatch arrangement.
Branch Mismatch Structures:
A mismatch can occur when one entity makes a
deductible payment to a branch and the taxpayer’s residence
jurisdiction treats the payment as income received by its foreign
branch, and, therefore, exempt from income tax under domestic
law. Likewise, the branch’s jurisdiction disregards the branch,
and, thus, does not subject the income to tax. In other words,
neither the residence jurisdiction nor the branch jurisdiction
includes the payment in ordinary income. In the following
example, an MNE uses a disregarded branch structure to achieve
a favorable D/NI result.
Example 4:36 A Co., an entity resident of Country A,
has a branch in Country B (B Branch). A Co. lends money to C
Co., a related company of A Co. and an entity resident of
Country C, through B Branch. C Co. pays interest to B Branch
on the loan.
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A Co.
Country A

No income
inclusion

Payment

Deduction

C Co.
Country C

B Branch
Country B

No income
inclusion

Loan

Country A, Country B, and Country C Perspectives: C
Co. deducts the interest payment under Country C’s domestic
laws. A Co. excludes the interest payment because the payment
is attributable to a foreign branch (B Branch) under Country A’s
domestic laws. Moreover, Country B does not tax the interest
income because A Co. does not have sufficient presence in
Country B under that jurisdiction’s domestic laws. Therefore,
the structure gives rise to an intra-group mismatch that achieves
a D/NI outcome.
OECD’s Recommendations: The OECD recommends
for a disregarded branch structure that the payer jurisdiction
(Country C) deny C Co.’s deduction for a payment that gives
rise to a D/NI outcome to the extent that the mismatch is a result
of a payment to a disregarded branch (B Branch). Therefore, C
Co. cannot deduct its interest payment to B Branch.37
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IV. TAX POLICY
Hybrid mismatch arrangements raise several policy
concerns that can impact tax revenue, competition, fairness,
economic efficiency and transparency.38 Although taxpayers
incur initial costs for advice and implementation of hybrid
mismatch arrangements, these arrangements can lead to
significant tax savings—that is, MNEs have the potential to
reduce the overall tax burden for the parties involved.
Consequently, the tax authorities are unable to collect as much
tax revenue and collectively lose revenue in the process. The
tax advantages that these structures create may also provide
MNEs with a competitive advantage in comparison to small or
mid-sized companies, which cannot easily expend the cost for
tax advice nor implement mismatch arrangements.39 MNEs may
have access to tax planning experts or strategies (which reduce
their tax liabilities) but are cost prohibitive to smaller businesses,
which some argue is inherently unfair.40
Hybrid mismatch arrangements can affect economic
efficiency, i.e., investors may find cross-border investment more
attractive in locales conducive to hybrid mismatches than an
equal domestic investment. 41 Furthermore, hybrid mismatch
arrangements may add to financial instability by increases in
tax-favored leveraging or borrowing and a rise in risk-taking
because investments that were uneconomic before tax may
become practicable after tax. These tax-driven arrangements
may also affect transparency if the public does not fully grasp
the underlying cause of a taxpayer’s low effective tax rate.42
The tax policy behind the BEPS project centers on the
single tax principle, which provides that all income should be
taxed only once.43 Specifically, the tax rate that applies depends
on whether the income is passive or active, i.e., passive income
should be taxed at the residence country tax rate and active
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income at the average source country tax rate. Thus, the single
tax principle requires the removal of not only double taxation,
but double non-taxation as well (e.g., D/NI, DD transactions).44
Commentators have remarked that OECD’s Action 2 solutions
are “soft recommendations” rather than global minimum
standards.45 Consequently, the length of time for countries to
converge and adopt these recommendations is unclear and may
result in non-coordination and inconsistency. Although a
number of countries have displayed their intent to legislatively
integrate the OECD’s recommendations, other countries may
not act as deftly (or if at all) in this regard.46 The divergent
interests of different tax jurisdictions and unilateral action by
some countries to protect tax revenue have made it difficult to
establish a cohesive set of rules.47
To further complicate matters, each country must have a
working knowledge of the tax treatment of the hybrid
arrangements in other jurisdictions to apply the
recommendations.48 Without cooperation and transparency
from the taxpayers themselves to apply these rules under the
applicable domestic law of affected countries, government
agencies may find it difficult to recognize and determine the tax
effects of a hybrid mismatch arrangement (much less enforce the
rules under local law). Moreover, taxpayers may find it
appealing to restructure or replace existing hybrid mismatch
arrangements with other planning opportunities that achieve the
same D/NI or DD outcome but are beyond the reach of Action
2’s linking rules, e.g., income exempt from tax under a pure
territorial regime. Because each country can determine its own
domestic laws, countries may continue to vary in their treatment
of financial instruments (e.g., debt versus equity) or hybrid
entities (e.g., transparent or separate taxable entity).49 Yet, even
worse, countries may engage in a “race to the bottom” that
compromises the neutralizing effects of Action 2’s
recommendations in some tax jurisdictions.50
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Despite these challenges, the OECD has reported some
progress in this area. In particular, the OECD states:
Although not a minimum standard, Action 2 has
been rapidly adopted by a number of members of
the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework. EU
Member States adopted hybrid and branch
mismatch rules in Council Directive (EU) 2017
(“ATAD 2”) and hybrid mismatch rules were
also included as part of the US tax reform
legislation, which passed into law at the end of
last year.51
V. U.S. TAX IMPLICATIONS – THE EFFECTS OF THE
TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act has been touted as the most
significant U.S. tax reform since the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
As part of the recent tax overhaul, TCJA codified sweeping
changes that impact international tax—specifically, tax
provisions meant to deter and combat base erosion and profit
shifting. TCJA’s international tax provisions directly address
the factors under prior law (i.e., high corporate tax rate,
worldwide tax regime, deferral of overseas profits) that provided
incentives for MNEs to engage in tax arbitrage. The TCJA
reduced the corporate tax rate and added or modified provisions
to limit interest expense deductions, tax unrepatriated earnings,
move towards a territorial tax system, and impose a base erosion
and anti-abuse tax (“BEAT”). The following discusses key
provisions of TCJA that directly impact and may have been
implemented to defeat (or at least deter) the effect of hybrid
mismatch structures.
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Corporate Tax Rate
Prior to TCJA, corporations were subject to a graduated
tax rate structure and the top corporate tax rate was generally 35
percent on taxable income in excess of $10 million. Effective
for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2017, TCJA
provides a flat corporate tax rate of 21 percent.52 Although the
21% U.S. corporate tax rate is significantly lower than the prior
tax of 35%, this rate still exceeds the corporate tax rates of
competing jurisdictions such as Ireland’s 12.5% tax rate and the
United Kingdom’s 19% tax rate.53 Arguably, other countries
may respond to the U.S. in kind by competitively reducing their
tax rates below the current U.S. corporate tax rate of 21%.54
Deemed Repatriation of Accumulated Post-1986 Deferred
Foreign Income
The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated for 2015 that
U.S. companies accumulated approximately $2.6 trillion of
undistributed and previously untaxed foreign earnings
offshore.55 Under prior law, U.S. multinational companies could
defer taxation on unrepatriated foreign earnings and profits
generally declared as “permanently reinvested” abroad for
financial statement purposes. TCJA imposes a one-time tax on
these foreign earnings through the mechanism of deemed
repatriation, which subjects previously untaxed foreign earnings
to immediate taxation under the Subpart F rules.56 As the U.S.
moves towards a quasi-territorial tax system, the deemed
repatriation tax is in essence a transition tax on previously
unrepatriated foreign earnings. To ensure that all distributions
from foreign subsidiaries are treated in the same manner under
the quasi-territorial tax system (participation exemption
system),57 unrepatriated earnings must be taxed as if the earnings
are repatriated subject to a reduced tax rate. The provision is
effective for the last tax year of a foreign corporation that begins
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before January 1, 2018, and with respect to U.S. shareholders,
for the tax years in which or with which such foreign
corporations’ tax years end.
In general, the repatriation tax applies not only to
controlled foreign corporations, but also foreign corporations in
which a U.S. person owns a 10-percent voting interest.58 A U.S.
shareholder is required to include its pro rata share of certain
foreign subsidiaries’ post-1986 accumulated deferred foreign
earnings and profits.59 Pursuant to I.R.C. Section 965, the
foreign corporation’s Subpart F income is increased by the
greater of accumulated post-1986 deferred foreign earnings
determined as of November 9, 2017 or December 31, 201760 and
the U.S. shareholder must include this amount in its gross
income.61 The inclusion, however, is reduced by the U.S.
shareholder’s pro rata share of deficits from certain foreign
subsidiaries.62 Moreover, the U.S. shareholder may deduct a
portion of the income inclusion in a manner such that the
deduction results in a reduced tax rate on the inclusion of
previously untaxed foreign earnings.63 The amount of the
deduction depends on whether the deferred earnings are held in
cash or other assets—that is, the U.S. shareholder may deduct
from the inclusion the amount necessary to obtain a 15.5 percent
effective tax rate on deferred foreign earnings held in cash (or
cash equivalents) and an 8 percent effective tax rate on all other
earnings (i.e., illiquid assets).64
Furthermore, the U.S.
shareholder may offset the tax with foreign tax credits subject to
limitations, i.e., foreign tax credits are limited to the taxable
portion of the inclusion.65 The domestic corporation generally
may elect to pay the tax liability over an eight-year period.66
Lastly, if a U.S. shareholder expatriates67 within 10 years
of TCJA’s enactment on December 22, 2017 (i.e., 12/22/27),
then the formerly domestic corporation is subject to recapture of
the deduction.68 Indeed, the expatriated entity69 is denied any
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deduction on the inclusion and the entire inclusion is taxed at 35
percent.
Interest Expense Limitation
Earnings stripping occurs when a corporation pays
interest to a related party and the related party is not (or is only
minimally) subject to U.S. tax on the corresponding interest
income. Effective for tax years beginning after December 31,
2017, TCJA modified the earnings stripping provision under
I.R.C. Section 163(j) by limiting the business interest deduction
to the sum of the following for the taxable year:70 (1) business
interest income,71 (2) 30 percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted
taxable income (“ATI”) but not below zero, and (3) the
taxpayer’s floor plan financing interest.72 ATI is defined as
taxable income calculated without the following: (1) any item
of income, gain, deduction or loss that is not properly allocable
to a trade or business; (2) any business interest expense or
business interest income; (3) any net operating loss deduction;
(4) deductions for qualified business income under I.R.C. §
199A; and (5) for taxable years beginning before January 1,
2022, any deduction allowable for depreciation, amortization or
depletion.73 In other words, ATI is approximately equal to
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization for
tax years after December 31, 2017 and before January 1, 2022.
For tax years after December 31, 2021, ATI then approximately
equals earnings before interest and taxes. Furthermore, the
taxpayer may carryforward any disallowed business interest
deductions indefinitely subject to certain restrictions.74
Example 5: For the taxable year ended December 31,
2018, A Corporation has business interest income of $1,000,
ATI of $20,000 and no floor plan financing interest. A
Corporation pays $10,000 of business interest expense. A
Corporation’s deduction for business interest is limited to
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$7,000 [$1,000 + (30% x $20,000)] and the remaining $3,000 of
disallowed interest is carried forward indefinitely.
Pursuant to an exception for small businesses, taxpayers
with average annual gross receipts for the three-taxable-year
period ending with the prior taxable year that do not exceed $25
million are exempt from the interest expense limitation.75
Moreover, I.R.C. Section 163(j) does not apply to regulated
public utilities, certain real estate industries (by taxpayer’s
election), electric cooperatives, the trade or business of
performing services as an employee and farming businesses (by
taxpayer’s election).76
Participation Exemption System (a Quasi-territorial Tax
System)
As discussed in Part II, countries that follow a territorial
tax system impose tax only on income that is sourced within the
specific country’s borders. TCJA includes provisions that move
the U.S. from a worldwide tax system toward a quasi-territorial
tax regime under I.R.C. Section 245A.
Effective for
distributions made after December 31, 2017, a U.S. corporation
that owns at least 10% stock of foreign corporations77 may
deduct 100 percent of the foreign-source portion of the
dividends that it receives from these foreign corporations.78
Notably, this provision does not apply to non-corporate U.S.
shareholders (e.g., individuals). Furthermore, this dividend
deduction applies only to income of foreign corporations and not
to income of branches. I.R.C. Section 245A effectively exempts
certain foreign source income through this 100-percent
dividends-received deduction (“DRD”) even if there is no
withholding tax on the dividend at source and the foreign
subsidiary paid the dividend from earnings that were not subject
to foreign tax in its country of incorporation. The foreignsource portion of the dividend is the amount that bears the same
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ratio to the dividend as the undistributed foreign earnings79 bears
to the foreign corporation’s80 total undistributed earnings and
profits.81 Furthermore, the Internal Revenue Code disallows a
foreign tax credit or deduction for paid or accrued taxes
attributable to the portion of a distribution that qualifies for the
DRD.82
To qualify for the DRD, the U.S. corporation must
satisfy a holding period requirement, i.e., the domestic
corporation must hold the stock of the specified 10%-owned
foreign corporation for more than 365 days during the 731-day
period beginning on the date that is 365 days before the date on
which the share becomes ex-dividend with respect to the
dividend.83 In essence, the U.S. has eliminated U.S. tax on
repatriated foreign earnings in an effort to disincentivize U.S.
multinationals from keeping their earnings offshore.
Hybrid Dividends:
I.R.C. Section 245A squarely addresses hybrid mismatch
arrangements, which take advantage of the different tax
treatments under U.S. and foreign laws of certain payments (e.g.,
hybrid financial instrument, hybrid entities) that produce D/NI
or DD outcomes.84 The purpose of the provision is to deter the
benefits of such tax arbitrage and it follows generally (but does
not codify all) the OECD’s Action 2 recommendations for
hybrid financial instruments.85 In accordance with the single tax
principle, a U.S. shareholder is disallowed from claiming the
100-percent DRD for any dividend from a controlled foreign
corporation (“CFC”) that is a hybrid dividend.86
As illustrated in the examples in Part III, a hybrid
dividend results when a CFC distributes a dividend to a U.S.
shareholder and both the foreign corporation and the U.S.
shareholder can deduct the dividend under each entity’s
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respective tax jurisdictions—that is, the foreign corporation
(payor) may claim a deduction (or other tax benefit) for the
dividend in its country and the U.S. shareholder (payee) may
also deduct the dividend in the U.S. under the general rule of
I.R.C. Section 245A.87 The U.S. shareholder, however, is
denied the DRD, and thus, the double deduction that taxpayers
may otherwise claim is prevented.88 Moreover, if a controlled
foreign corporation distributes a hybrid dividend to another
recipient-controlled foreign corporation, then the latter treats the
hybrid dividend as Subpart F income. Accordingly, its U.S.
shareholder must include the shareholder’s pro rata share in
gross income.89 Lastly, the U.S. shareholder cannot claim
foreign tax credits or deductions for any taxes paid or accrued
with respect to the hybrid dividend.90
Under these
circumstances, the provision effectively blocks the U.S.
shareholder (payee) from the benefits of a tax-free repatriation
of foreign income.
Base Erosion Anti-avoidance Tax
Cross-border Payments between Affiliated Companies:
In an effort to target base erosion and profit shifting,
I.R.C. Section 59A (as added by TCJA) provides the base
erosion anti-avoidance tax (“BEAT”). These provisions are
meant to deter base erosion via deductible cross-border
payments between affiliated companies (i.e., foreign parents or
controlled foreign corporations).91 Simply put, BEAT’s purpose
is to deter earnings stripping transactions, which multinational
entities have used to shift profits to lower tax jurisdictions
through intercompany transfers. BEAT appears to take
particular aim at U.S. subsidiaries of foreign parents that shift
profits outside of the U.S. through outbound payments.
In essence, BEAT is an alternative minimum tax, which
an MNE must pay if it reduces its regular U.S. tax liability below
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the applicable percentage of its modified taxable income for this
purpose. BEAT applies to U.S.-owned and foreign-owned
multinational corporations and casts its net on payments to
foreign parents and foreign subsidiaries.92 Consistent with the
single tax principle, if the income is not subject to tax at
residence, then BEAT imposes tax at the source of the income.93
Effective for base erosion payments paid or accrued in
taxable years beginning after December 31, 2017, a taxpayer
must pay a “base erosion minimum tax”94 if (1) the taxpayer is
a corporation (other than a regulated investment company, a real
estate investment trust, or an S corporation) with average annual
gross receipts of at least $500 million for the three-year taxable
year period ending with the preceding tax year and (2) the
corporation’s base erosion percentage for the tax year is 3
percent95 or greater.96
The base erosion percentage is
determined by dividing the taxpayer’s aggregate base erosion
tax benefits (generally, any deduction from certain base erosion
payments to a foreign related party)97 by the taxpayer’s
aggregate deductions allowed [tax-deductible expenses], taking
into account base erosion tax benefits subject to certain
exceptions.98 A base erosion payment is (1) any deductible
amount that a taxpayer paid or accrued to a foreign related
party99 (e.g., interest payment to foreign parent, royalty payment
to foreign subsidiary), (2) paid or accrued to a foreign related
party to acquire property that is subject to depreciation or
amortization, (3) certain reinsurance payments to a foreign
related party, or (4) certain payments with respect to a surrogate
foreign corporation or related foreign persons that results in a
reduction of the taxpayer’s gross receipts.100 Therefore, BEAT
may significantly impact companies that depend on cross-border
transactions (e.g., professional service, banks, insurance
companies).

2019 / Hybrid Mismatch / 28

The tax is equal to the excess of the applicable rate (5%
for taxable year beginning in 2018, 10% for tax year beginning
in 2019 through 2025, and 12.5% for tax year beginning after
December 31, 2025)101 of the taxpayer’s modified taxable
income over its regular tax liability reduced by certain tax credits
(but not below zero).102 For this purpose, the modified taxable
income is generally equal to taxable income without any base
erosion tax benefit or base erosion percentage from a net
operating loss deduction.103 In other words, the taxpayer adds
back to its taxable income any base erosion tax benefit and base
erosion percentage from a net operating loss deduction. The
taxpayer must compare taxes calculated under BEAT to its
regular tax liability and, consequently, pay the higher levy.
Notably, BEAT applies only to payments made to related
parties, and thus, taxpayers may avoid BEAT altogether by
transacting with customers or unrelated distributors.104
Hybrid Transactions or Hybrid Entities:
As discussed in Part III, a hybrid transaction is any
transaction, series of transactions, agreement, or instrument
where the payer’s tax jurisdiction treats the payment(s) as
deductible interest or royalties (e.g., U.S. federal income tax)
while the payee recipient’s jurisdiction does not. The difference
in treatment between the jurisdictions results in a D/NI
(deduction with no corresponding income inclusion) or DD
(double deduction) mismatch to the taxpayer’s benefit. A hybrid
entity is considered fiscally transparent (e.g., partnership) for
U.S. federal income tax purposes while another tax jurisdiction
considers the same entity as non-transparent or opaque (e.g., C
corporation) for tax purposes. In contrast, a reverse hybrid entity
is considered non-transparent or opaque for U.S. tax purposes
while another tax jurisdiction considers the same entity fiscally
transparent.
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Consistent with the OECD’s BEPS Action 2 initiative
and the single tax principle, I.R.C. Section 267A denies a
deduction for payments to a related party pursuant to a hybrid
transaction or hybrid entity if (1) there is no corresponding
inclusion to the related party under its tax jurisdiction (D/NI) or
(2) the related party is also allowed a deduction under its tax
jurisdiction (DD). I.R.C. Section 267A is effective for tax years
beginning after December 31, 2017.
Proposals for Reform
Practitioners and commentators have raised their
concerns about the recent legislation, and in particular, technical
and policy issues of the provisions involving hybrid
arrangements. Overall, the consensus appears to be that the U.S.
is moving in the right direction toward international tax reform,
but there is still much work left to be done. The following
discusses key issues and proposals for reform (through
legislation or regulation) debated by commentators.
Deemed Repatriation Tax:
Deemed repatriation rules under I.R.C. Section 965
impose an immediate tax on previously untaxed foreign earnings
at rates of 15.5% on cash and cash equivalents (i.e., liquid assets)
held abroad and 8% on all other unrepatriated earnings (i.e.,
illiquid assets). Commentators have expressed a number of
concerns about the technical aspects of this provision. First,
cash equivalent as defined for this purpose appears overly broad.
The definition of cash includes financial instruments, e.g.,
options contracts, futures contracts and bona-fide hedging
transactions, that if held overseas are subject to a tax rate of
15.5% under these rules.105 Commentators have argued that this
treatment could be over-inclusive because some of these
financial instruments may be illiquid or may have a non-tax
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avoidance business purpose.106 The Secretary is authorized to
issue regulations or other guidance that may be necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of I.R.C. Section 965.107
Accordingly, Treasury should provide regulatory guidance that
clarifies the term cash and cash equivalents for this purpose.
Second, downward attribution rules (meant to limit
corporate inversions) apply under I.R.C. Section 965 for
purposes of determining the U.S. ownership of a foreign
corporation. In other words, stock owned by a foreign
corporation is attributed to a U.S. person for purposes of
establishing a controlled foreign corporation. As a result, the
amount of taxpayers defined as a U.S. shareholder in a CFC may
increase and cause a higher inclusion of income subject to the
deemed repatriation tax.108 To prevent this over inclusion,
Congress should consider limiting the downward attribution
rules only to corporations.109
Third, the deemed repatriation tax is calculated using the
higher measured base of two testing dates, i.e., November 2,
2017 and December 31, 2017. Commentators have raised a
potential loophole related to the testing dates for taxpayers with
fiscal year ends (rather than calendar year ends). Taxpayers with
fiscal year ends (e.g., 6/30, 9/30) could potentially avoid
additional cash accumulations (subject to the deemed
repatriation tax) by distributing any increase as dividends.110 To
address this potential loophole, Treasury should provide
guidance that considers the facts and circumstances of a
taxpayer’s cash movements and investments.111
Lastly, if history repeats itself, MNEs during the 2004
tax holiday used repatriated earnings to distribute dividends to
or buyback stock from their shareholders rather than create new
jobs nor invest in capital spending or expansion.112 Although
MNEs repatriated offshore earnings because of the transition
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tax, a significant amount of the repatriated earnings was invested
in stock buybacks.113
Interest Expense Limitation:
The interest expense limitation is directed at MNEs that
use interest expense deductions to strip earnings out of highertax jurisdictions. Commentators have raised concerns over
various methods taxpayers could use to avoid the limitation. For
example, financial institutions with positive net interest can
lease assets and deduct the rental payments on those leases.114
Taxpayers could also opt to incur debt outside of the U.S. or to
issue preferred equity.115 The House and Senate bills included
a provision specifically directed at profit shifting by restricting
the U.S. entity’s share of debt based on its income or assets;
however, the provision was removed from the final legislation.
To prevent taxpayers from circumventing the interest expense
limitation, Congress should consider using a worldwide interest
allocation that allows a U.S. company to deduct only its
allocable share of interest expense based on its share of
worldwide income.116
BEAT :
The primary purpose of BEAT is to deter earnings
stripping transactions, which MNEs have used to shift profits to
lower tax jurisdictions through intercompany payments between
affiliated companies. Although BEAT appears to strengthen
U.S. taxation of inbound transactions, commentators have
argued over a number of issues that may impact the intended
effect of the tax. First, commentators have asserted that the $500
million revenue threshold that triggers BEAT is too high, i.e.,
the amount is 10 times the threshold under I.R.C. Section 385
directed at earnings stripping. Because of the high threshold,
many MNEs below this threshold that engage in profit shifting
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transactions (otherwise subject to BEAT) are able to avoid the
tax.117 Moreover, BEAT does not apply unless the base erosion
payments are above the specified threshold, which is generally
3%.
Both thresholds create a “cliff effect” and may encourage
MNEs to plan their structures or transactions in a manner such
that they fall right below the required thresholds to escape BEAT
entirely—that is, $499 million in average annual gross receipts
and/or a base erosion percentage of 2.99%.118 Nonetheless, even
when BEAT does apply, the nominal tax rate of 10% appears
hardly sufficient to deter profit shifting.119 To address these
issues, Congress should consider the following: significantly
reduce BEAT’s $500 million revenue threshold and add an asset
test similar to the thresholds under I.R.C Section 385’s earnings
stripping regulations; remove the base erosion percentage
threshold of 3% altogether; and increase the BEAT rate of 10%
to a tax rate that would more likely deter profit shifting. Perhaps
Congress should simply restrict BEAT to outbound payments
made to no or low tax jurisdictions.120
Second, base erosion payments, as defined, generally
exclude payments for cost of goods sold (except for inverted
corporations after November 9, 2017). As a result, taxpayers
could exploit planning opportunities that avoid BEAT altogether
such as capitalizing royalty payments into cost of goods sold,
embedding foreign intellectual property into a product’s cost of
goods sold, or restructuring the supply chain.121 For example, a
U.S. subsidiary pays a foreign parent for tangible property and
includes the goods in its inventory for sale. The U.S. subsidiary
also pays a royalty to the foreign parent for the trademark or
distribution rights of these goods. Because the royalty payments
are capitalized as part of cost of goods sold, the U.S. subsidiary
is able to elude BEAT on these royalty payments.122 To prevent
this loophole, commentators have suggested that base erosion
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payments include payments for goods, but the taxpayer should
be permitted to claim a cost component deduction (which would
address the royalty payments concern).123 However, there is no
clear answer to this issue because a tax on cross-border sales of
inventory could prove problematic with the World Trade
Organization and, consequently, result in trade and treaty
issues.124
Third, certain services with no mark-up (i.e., services
using the service cost method) are excluded from base erosion
payments. Commentators and practitioners disagree over the
treatment of the cost component of services with a markup—that
is, some argue that any service with a markup is included for
BEAT purposes in total while others argue that only the markup
is included.125 Proposed Treasury Regulations clarify whether
taxpayers may exclude any portion of the services with a markup
from BEAT—that is, taxpayers may use the service cost method
exception if there is a markup, but the portion of any payment
that exceeds the total cost of services (the markup component)
is ineligible for this exception and consequently a base erosion
payment.126
Fourth, BEAT does not provide a credit for foreign taxes
and, therefore, may function more as a tax on foreign source
income rather than serve its intended purpose to limit profit
shifting. For example, a multinational with substantial foreign
source income from high tax jurisdictions makes the minimum
base erosion payments subject to BEAT. Because there is no
foreign tax credit for BEAT, it acts as a tax on foreign source
income in this scenario instead of serving its intended purpose,
which is to restrict the effects of profit shifting.127 Accordingly,
Congress should consider allowing a foreign tax credit for
BEAT.128
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Fifth, commentators expressed various other concerns
including whether taxpayers must aggregate individual
payments for BEAT purposes (e.g., if interest payments are
assessed at a gross or net basis); BEAT is over-inclusive in
certain circumstances (e.g., applies to ordinary transactions,
nonabusive commercial transactions, and securities lending);
BEAT may penalize routine lending transactions between
groups; and BEAT may impact intragroup interest payments
made by regulated financial intermediaries (e.g., banks,
securities dealers).129 To address these concerns, Congress
should reconsider using a worldwide allocation of interest that
allows a U.S. company to deduct only its allocable share of
interest expense based on its share of worldwide income or
assets.130
Finally, because the anti-hybrid provisions limit interest
and royalty payments between related parties, MNEs may find
ways to deduct other types of payments to create D/NI or DD
outcomes.131 In addition, a number of issues remain unresolved
in this area, e.g., the treatment of conduit arrangements and
multiple country arrangements, which may impact the
effectiveness of the anti-hybrid provisions.132 Treasury should
provide guidance that addresses these remaining concerns.

VI. CONCLUSION
MNEs have used hybrid mismatch arrangements to
produce favorable tax outcomes (D/NI or DD) that erode its tax
bases in applicable jurisdictions through double non-taxation or
tax deferral resulting in significant tax savings. In 2015, the
OECD issued its final reports on the 15 Action Items included
in its Base Erosion Profit Shifting Plan—specifically, Action 2
provides recommendations under domestic law to neutralize the
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effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements. In an effort to defeat
these transactions, the U.S. has codified key provisions in recent
legislation that generally follow the OECD’s recommendations
and directly address in TCJA’s anti-hybrid provisions the impact
of hybrid mismatch arrangements.
However, multilateral
efforts are needed to deter hybrid mismatch arrangements and
coherently dismantle the benefits of base erosion and profit
shifting. Moreover, there is a risk that TCJA’s recent provisions
may be changed in the future, and as in any match, only time
will tell if these provisions produce the results intended or if
these transactions continue off the BEATen path as the “perfect
mismatch.”
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